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Abstract 
Since the boom of hostile activity in the US and the UK during the 1980s, hostile 
takeovers, as a form of M&A transactions, constitute an integral part of contemporary 
global business practice and a field of rapid development in the market for corporate 
control. The purpose of this thesis is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
phenomenon of hostile takeovers, from its creation until its recent developments. 
 
The study begins by presenting the theoretical background which is important for the 
understanding of the subject. This includes a concrete definition of the notion of 
hostile takeovers, as well as an analysis of its core elements and the various hostile 
tactics which may be used, with hostile tender offers being the prominent. 
Furthermore, the historical background and the rationale of the phenomenon are also 
presented. The thesis, furthermore, proceeds with the examination of the basic anti-
takeover mechanisms, which can be implemented either before or after a hostile 
tender offer, and discusses their level of effectiveness. The focus, however, of this 
study is found in the presentation of a comparative analysis of the applicable legal 
framework on hostile tender offers in the United States and in the European Union, 
based on the examination of the applicable legal instruments and on the development 
of case law. In its final chapter, the thesis examines, also, how hostile activity emerged 
and is regulated in Greece, whereas it concludes by presenting information on the 
recent takeover activity, along with the final remarks.  
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Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are corporate governance mechanisms, enabling 
companies to grow, maximize their profits, alter or expand their object of business 
activity and improve their competitive position. Stemming from the basic principle that 
“one plus one equals three”1,  they both constitute means of selling and acquiring 
companies, in whole or in part. Although the above terms are considered as 
interchangeable, in fact they are substantially different. 
  
A merger is an amalgamation of two or more companies, in which “all but one legally 
cease to exist, and the combined organization continues under the original name of 
the surviving firm”2. From a legal perspective3 mergers are divided into various sub-
categories, such as “statutory” or “direct” mergers4, subsidiary mergers5 and reverse 
subsidiary mergers6, whereas from an economic perspective7, they are classified as 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate8. Furthermore, the term merger is often 
confused with the one of consolidation, from which, however, it differs significantly, as 
consolidation exists when two companies combine to form a completely new entity. 
Consequently, in consolidations there is no “surviving” company, as both are dissolved 
and only the new company remains in operation9. 
 
On the other hand, an acquisition or a takeover10 is a transaction or a series of 
transactions, through which a natural or legal person or a group of persons takes a 
                                                 
 
1 Gorzala Jeannette (2010), “The Art of Hostile Takeover Defense”, Igel Verlag, Hamburg, p.9.  
2 Depamphilis Donald M. (2008), “Mergers, Acquisitions, and other Restructuring Activities”, 4th edition, Academic Press Advanced 
Finance Series, p.5 
3 The term refers to the legal structure used to complete the transaction and it is used in DePamphilis p.5 
4 In which all the assets and liabilities of the merged company (“target”) are assumed by the “surviving” firm , as stated in Gaughan 
Patrick A. (2011), “Mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructurings”, 5th edition, John Wiley and Sons Inc, p.12  
5 also referred to as “forward triangular merger”, in which a subsidiary of the purchasing company (not the purchasing company 
itself) absorbs the target company, as stated in Gaughan p.13 
6 also referred to as “, reverse triangular merger” in which the target company absorbs a subsidiary of the parent company 
7 namely, depending on the position of the merging firms in the corporate value chain, as stated in DePamphilis, p.6 
8 According to DePanphilis, pp.6-7 and Gaughan pp.13-14, horizontal mergers occur between companies within the same industry, 
whereas vertical mergers occur between corporations having a buyer-seller relationship. If the merging companies operate in 
different industries and do not have a buyer-seller relationship, then the merger is characterized as conglomerate. 
9 Gaughan, p.13 
10 Although the terms “acquisition” and “takeover” are used interchangeably, they carry slightly different connotations. 
Concretely, the term "takeover" implies that the target company opposes to being bought, whereas "acquisition" usually describes 
more amicable transactions, as stated in: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/acquisition.asp . According to another definition 
(DePamphilis p.5) “takeover” is a generic term which refers to a change in the controlling interest of a corporation.  
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controlling interest in another firm11(“target company”), by purchasing its assets or a 
voting majority of its shares. After the acquisition, the acquired corporation continues 
to exist as a subsidiary of the purchasing company12. Unlike mergers, which are 
normally “friendly”, takeovers are classified as “friendly” and “hostile”. 
 
Friendly takeovers are negotiated settlements, in which the purchasing company offers 
to acquire another firm and this proposal is welcomed by the board of directors or the 
management of the target. On the other hand, in hostile takeovers, the potential 
acquirer makes an unsolicited takeover offer to the target company, which is resisted 
by the latter’s management and board of directors 13.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of 
hostile takeovers. The first chapter presents the theoretical background of hostile 
takeovers, namely it proceeds to the analytical definition of the term and describes the 
possible hostile takeover tactics, as well as it presents the historical background of the 
phenomenon and its rationale. The second chapter introduces the most common anti-
takeover mechanisms, both proactive and reactive, and discusses the level of their 
effectiveness. Chapter three offers a comparative analysis of the legal framework of 
tender offers in the United States and in Europe and decides upon which of the two 
systems facilitates hostile takeovers. Finally, the fourth and last chapter examines how 
hostile activity is presented and regulated in Greece. 
 
 
                                                 
11 or in a legal subsidiary of another firm or in selected assets of another firm, such as a manufacturing facility, as stated in 
Depamphilis, p.5  
12 Depamphilis, p.5 
13 Ibid 
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THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
THE DEFINITION OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
Hostile takeovers constitute a mechanism, by which a company (“the bidder”) seeks to 
gain control over another corporation (“the target”), without the consent of the 
latter’s board of directors or of its management14. The reasons behind such an 
opposition may stem either from the valuation of the transaction as unprofitable or 
detrimental for the target company and its shareholders, or from the managers’ and 
directors’ personal interests, namely the fear of being replaced. The term “hostile 
takeover” is also applicable in cases where the bidder addresses solely the 
shareholders, without previous informing the board or the management of the target 
company15.  
 
Even though the theory does not distinguish based on the company’s legal status, in 
practice, hostile takeovers only occur in publicly listed corporations. This is, firstly, due 
to their dispersed ownership, which entails to the exercise of the corporate control by 
the company’s board of directors. Hence, even though the final decision is taken by 
the shareholders, the board is responsible to negotiate the terms of the potential 
transaction. On the contrary, shares in private companies are held by a limited number 
of shareholders, therefore, the bidder usually negotiates directly with them. Another 
factor is the legal obligation of the publicly listed companies to publish information on 
their corporate performance, an obligation which does not apply to private firms. A 
potential bidder is, thus, able to proceed to a better assessment of the performance 
and strategy of the first, than of the latter.16 Consequently, dispersed ownership and 
“information asymmetry” are the two characteristics leading to the existence of hostile 
takeovers only in the public arena17. 
 
                                                 
14 Zarin Samim and Yang Erik (2011), “Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and defense strategies against them”, Bachelor’s 
Thesis, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, p.2, retrieved from: 
https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/28242/1/gupea_2077_28242_1.pdf 
15 Ibid p.11 
16 Möhlmann B.W.A (2012), “Hostile takeovers: The long term effect on shareholder value of acquiring companies”, Master’s 
thesis, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, p.12, retrieved from: https://thesis.eur.nl  
17 Ibid 
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An additional characteristic of hostile takeovers is that they are normally disclosed to 
the press18. Therefore, under another definition19, hostile takeovers occur when it is 
publicly announced that the target company “aggressively” rejects the offer made by 
the bidder. Consequently, the concept of hostility is inextricably linked to negotiations 
which are “far from completion”20. However, in contemporary business practice, 
takeover negotiations usually commence long before the public disclosure of the bid or 
of the intention to bid. Furthermore, in most cases, only successfully completed 
negotiations are announced. Consequently, the final transaction may, at the end of the 
day, seem “friendly”, even though the private negotiations would have been regarded 
as “hostile”, had they been publicly revealed. On the other hand, in case confidential 
negotiations break down, it is also possible for one of the parties to disclose 
information about the bid, in order to enhance its bargaining position21.  
 
Public announcements of takeover attempts constitute part of the negotiation 
process, therefore the distinction between hostile and friendly takeovers is often a 
difficult task. Moreover, as in every negotiation, the intentions and attitudes of the 
parties are volatile, since circumstances may easily change. Thus, even though a 
takeover may seem initially as “hostile”, it may eventually result in a “friendly” 
settlement.   
HOSTILE TAKEOVER TACTICS 
Every takeover process comprises of a series of operations, performed sequentially to 
lead to a specific result22, namely to the completion of the acquisition. After the 
determination of the bidder’s acquisition criteria and goals and the identification of 
the target company23, the bidder approaches the target to assess its interest in a 
potential takeover or to proceed to a takeover offer. In hostile takeovers, the target 
company’s board or incumbent management opposes to this initial approach or offer, 
                                                 
18 DePamphilis, p.99 
19 Schwert William G. (2000), “Hostility in Takeovers: In the eyes of the Beholder?”, The Journal of Finance, Volume 55 (LV), Issue 
6, p.2600 
20 Ibid 
21 Concretely, by revealing their intentions, bidders aim to put the management of the company under shareholder pressure, 
whereas the target may disclose a takeover attempt to attract alternative bidders.  
22 Gorzala, p. 10 
23 Ibid 
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however the deal is eventually made24, as the bidder may implement a series of 
“aggressive tactics”, such as the bear hug, the Saturday night offer, the proxy contest, 
the toehold position, the tender offer (takeover bid) and the two-tier tender offer (two 
-tier bid). 
The bear hug is a tactic adopted when the initial approach of the target is considered 
unsuccessful or when the intentions of the target’s management towards a potential 
takeover are unclear. In this tactic, the bidder makes a formal acquisition proposal, 
which may be followed by a public announcement25, to the target’s board of 
directors26.The proposal frequently concerns the acquisition of the target’s shares at a 
substantial premium to their current stock value and demands a rapid decision27. A 
similar tactic is the Saturday night special, which is a surprising acquisition offer made 
to the board on the Friday or Saturday night28 and it is open for only a brief period.  
By using these methods, the bidder aims to achieve a negotiated settlement, which is 
possible due to the fiduciary duties of the board towards the target’s shareholders. In 
particular, directors who vote against a generous proposal which greatly exceeds the 
current market value of the target company, may be subject to lawsuits, due to the 
breach of their duty to act in the best interest of the target’s shareholders. Thus, the 
bear hug and the Saturday night special put the target “into play” and force the 
target’s board to accept the takeover proposal.29 
Another famous tactic is the proxy contest or proxy fight30. In its simplest form, the 
proxy fight occurs when a group of “dissident” or “insurgent” shareholders, which is 
typically a non-controlling group, seeks to obtain representation on the board of 
directors or to bring other changes in the company by obtaining the right to vote on 
                                                 
24 Franks Julian and Mayer Colin (1996), “Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure”, Journal of Financial 
Economics Volume 40, Issue 1, p.165 
25 In these cases, the tactic is called “strong bear hug”, as simple “bear hugs” are made without a concurrent public 
announcement, as stated in Bruner Robert F., “Applied Mergers and Acquisitions”, John Wiley &Sons Inc, 2004, p.831  
26 DePamphilis, pp.101-102 
27 Ibid, p.99. If the bidder threatens to reduce the offering price in case of an opposition or delay, then the tactic is called “ super-
strong bear hug”, as stated in Bruner (2004) p.831 
28 Namely on the last working day of the week, when only few investors pay attention 
29 DePamphilis, p.102 
30 Proxy fights in the US are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In Europe, the Takeover Directive 
(Directive 2004/25/EC) is generally silent on the issue of proxies, which are regulated differently among Member States. The great 
divergence of proxy legislation renders its regulation at European level necessary.  
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behalf of other shareholders (proxy vote) 31. Ιn hostile takeovers, the bidding company 
attempts to persuade the shareholders to use their proxy votes in favor of the 
takeover or to replace the “incumbent” board32 with directors who support the 
takeover.  
The proxy fight mechanism, though expensive33, it can be effective, especially in 
combination with the establishment of a toehold position. Under this method, the 
bidder, after purchasing a small fraction of the target’s shares in the open market, 
becomes a minority shareholder of the target company. This “toehold position” entails 
voting power for the bidder, which is of great importance in a proxy contest, as it 
enables him to influence the target’s board and shareholders in certain decisions34. 
Furthermore, it decreases the cost of the acquisition, allowing the bidder to acquire a 
part of the target’s stock anonymously, without paying the premium required in a 
formal bid35. However, under most takeover regulations, if the purchase exceeds a 
certain percentage of the target’s stock, the bidder is obliged to publicly disclose its 
position and intentions36. 
The most common hostile takeover mechanism is, however, the hostile tender offer or 
takeover bid37. This method enables the bidder to circumvent the target’s board and 
management and address directly the shareholders, by publicly offering, for a specific 
period, to purchase all or a fraction of their outstanding shares at a specific price, 
which is often at a substantial premium of their fair market value38. To decrease the 
cost of the takeover effected by this method, the bidder may attempt to establish a 
                                                 
31 See DePamphilis, p.100, Gaugan p. 271 and Ernst and Young (1994), “Mergers and Acquisitions, Back-to-Basics Techniques for 
the 90’s”, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons Inc, p.157  
32 Dodd Peter and Warner Jerold B.(1983), “On corporate governance: A study of Proxy Contests”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Volume 11, Issues 1-4,  p.401  
33 The fees of the proxy solicitors, investment bankers and attorneys, the advertisement expenses and the litigation costs in 
contentious proxy contests, render them an expensive takeover tactic. However, tender offers are regarded far more expensive, 
as it may require the purchase of a controlling interest at the target at a substantial premium, as stated in DePamphilis, p.102 
34 Möhlmann, p.22 
35 Ibid and DePamphilis p.103 
36 In the US, the acquirer that exceeds the threshold of 5% of the target’s equity stake is obliged to file a Schedule 13D with the 
SEC, explaining the reason for the acquisition and its intentions regarding the target company and the target company must be 
simultaneously informed (Möhlmann p. 22). In European level, article 9 of the European Transparency Directive (Directive 
2004/109/EC, as amended by Directives 2008/22/EC, 2010/73/EU, 2010/78/EU,2013/50/EU) obliges the acquirer of 5% (or lower, 
depending on national law) of the target’s equity stake to notify the target company, as stated by Matthijs Nelemans and Michael 
Schouten in Bainbridge Stephen M. (2013), “ Research Handbook on Insider Trading”, Edward Elgar, p.464  
37 Both terms are used to describe the public offer made from the bidder to the shareholders of the target company for the 
purchase of all or of a fraction of their shares. However, the term “tender offer” is used in US legislation and theory, whereas the 
term “takeover bid” is used in European statutes  
38 DePamhilis p.104, Möhlmann p.22 
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“toehold position” before launching an offer. Thus, the bidder would be able to 
acquire a fraction of the target’s shares without paying a premium39 . 
Another relative practice is the two-tier tender offer /bid, under which the bidder 
purchases a certain number of shares which are required to gain the target’s control, 
whereas at a later date the bidder acquires the remaining shares at a lower price40. 
Even though the two-tier bids/tender offers are not per se illegal in the US, many state 
statutes require equal treatment for all shareholders or provide appraisal rights to 
shareholders owning the remaining shares, such as the determination of the “fair 
value” of those shares by the court41. At the European level, the Takeover Directive, by 
setting forth the principal of equivalent treatment of all shareholders of the same 
class42 and the mandatory bid rule43, prohibits the implementation of this tactic.  
As the tender offer is the most commonly used method to achieve a hostile 
acquisition, this thesis focuses on examining its regulatory scope at US and EU level, 
with special reference to the Greek law, in the following chapters 3 and 4. 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
It has been widely accepted, that M&A come in waves, which “reflect the pattern of 
the number and the total value of takeover deals over time”44. Many countries 
experienced intense takeover activity, followed by periods of downturns during the 
past decades.45USA is the country with the longest history in M&A, as it has so far 
experienced six merger waves, with the first going back to 1983, after the Depression, 
and lasting until 190446,47 . Takeover activity was also witnessed in the UK, due to the 
                                                 
39 Möhlmann, p.22 
40 DePamhilis p.105 
41 Ibid 
42 Council Directive 2004/25, 2004, O.J. (L 142) 12(EC), art. 3§1. (a)  
43 Id. art. 5 
44Martynova Marina and Renneboog Luc (2008), “A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We 
Stand?”  Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 32, Issue 10, p. 2.150 
45 Sudarsanam Sudi (2003), “Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions- The Challenges”, Prentice Hall Financial Times, p.14 
46 Gorzala p.5·   
47 Surprisingly enough, commentators use different criteria to determine the exact periods, during which merger waves emerged. 
According to Lipton Martin (2006), in “ Merger Waves in the 19th, 20th and 21st Centuries”, The Davies Lecture Osgood Hall Law 
School York University,  p.3 ,retrieved from   : http://cornerstone-business.com/MergerWavesTorontoLipton.pdf   “ The starting 
date and duration of each of these waves are not specific, although the ending dates for those that ended in wars or financial 
disasters, like the 1929 crash or the bursting of the Millennium Bubble, are more definite”. Consequently, there has been a great 
divergence regarding the time frames of the below analyzed merger waves in USA, UK and Continental Europe. Therefore, it 
should be stated, that the time frames presented in this thesis derived from a comparative analysis of those proposed in theory.  
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emergence of the three major merger waves48, the first of which was traced in 1960s. 
In Continental Europe, M&A existed in smaller scale during the 1960s49, however, the 
first substantive merger wave occurred in the 1980s50. 
 
Hostile takeovers, as a part of M&A activity, constitute, mainly, a phenomenon of the 
Anglo- Saxon economic sphere51. Even though they made their first appearance in the 
UK in the early 1950s52 and in the US in the 1960s53, the boom of hostile activity 
occurred for both countries during the 1980s. Concretely, in the US, hostile takeovers 
flourished during the fourth merger wave (1984-1989)54. During this period the so-
called corporate raiders or “predators”55, proceeded to hostile takeovers towards 
under-performing corporations56, aiming to achieve the highest return in the shortest 
time. At the time, hostile takeovers were considered as a highly profitable activity and 
an effective form of corporate re-organization. The end of the fourth wave came in 
1989, after economy had entered a period of recession, followed by the crash of the 
stock market in 198757 and the collapse of the junk bonds market58,59.  
In the UK, the history of hostile takeovers began in the early 1950s, when economic 
turmoil of the postwar period encouraged asset arbitrage 60,61. The advent of hostile 
takeovers shocked the British business community, which considered the phenomenon 
                                                 
48 Sudarsanam, p.24 · However, according to Pazarskis Michael, Eleftheriadis Ιordanis, Drogalas George, and Christodoulou 
Petros(2006), “Exploring the Development and the Nature of Merger Waves: Evidence from US and UK Capital Markets”, 
Southeuropean Review of Business Finance & Accounting, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp. 9-11, UK has experienced four merger waves   
49 In particular, in Germany and France, as stated in Vancea Mariana (2013), “Merger and Acquisition Waves from the European 
Perspective”, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania, p.2, retrieved 
from: https://ideas.repec.org/a/ora/journl/v1y2013i2p272-283.html  
50 Ibid 
51Bruner Robert F. (2006), “Hostile Takeovers in Europe”, retrieved from: 
http://blogs.darden.virginia.edu/brunerblog/2006/11/hostile-takeovers-in-europe/   
52Armour, John and Skeel David A. Jr, p.1756 
53 Choper Jesse H., Coffee John C. & Gilson Ronald J. (2008), “Cases and Materials on Corporations”, 7th edition, Wolters Kluwer 
54 For a complete analysis of the US merger waves see Gorzala pp.4-7, Sudarsanam, pp.14-34, Gaughan pp.36-73 
55 after being financed mainly by junk bonds 
56 Sudarsanam, p.17, where it is also stated that he target was often a diversified firm, whose parts were sold-off after the 
acquisition was completed  
57 on the so called “Black Monday” 
58 Gaughan p.63 
59 The collapse of the Drexel Burnham Lambert investment bank, which specialized in financing takeovers through the issuance of 
junk bonds, was decisive for the demise of the junk bonds market, as stated in Seretakis Alexandros (2013), “Hostile Takeovers and 
Defensive Mechanisms in the United Kingdom and the United States: A Case Against the United States Regime”, the Ohio State 
Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal, Volume 8, Issue 2, p. 3 
60 Armour and Skeel, p.1756 
61 A famous example is the takeover of shoe retailer J. Sears in early 1953 by Charles Clore’s, as described in Armour and Skeel pp. 
1756-1757 
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as harmful for the industry62. Prejudice against hostile takeovers was overcome in 
195963. At that time the “Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses” were 
adopted64, which were latter (in 1968) replaced by the “Takeover Code”65.  Hostile 
takeover activity can be also found 1970s66, with a new generation of “predators”67 
taking action. Nevertheless, as in the US, takeovers reached extreme levels of hostility 
in the 1980s, during the third (for the UK) merger wave68 which ended in 1989. 
 
In Continental Europe, a combination of historical, cultural, structural and legal 
factors69 impeded the vast expansion of hostile takeovers. However, continental 
European countries did not remain immune from hostile takeovers, through their 
history of M&A activity. Takeover of the German company “Mannesman” by the 
British “Vodafone AirTouch” (1999) and the acquisition of Telecom Italia by Olivetty 
(1999) are two well-known examples of successful hostile bids70. In recent years, 
hostile bids in EU increased significantly since 2006. The acrimonious, but successful, 
takeover of “Arcelor” by “Mittal” (2006)71 , the “E.On’s”  bid for “Endesa” ( 2006)72 , 
and  the takeover attempt towards “Suez” by “Enel”73, are only a few examples of the 
vibrant takeover activity of this period.  
 
This brief historical review of the development of hostile takeovers proves, that they 
constitute an integral part of contemporary business practice. Over the years, the 
phenomenon has evolved increasingly, leading, inevitably, to the formulation of 
                                                 
62 According to Pazarskis, Eleftheriadis, Drogalas and Christodoulou P, p. 10, the Bank of England advised the English banks and 
other financial institutions against financing the “predators” of this period  
63 shortly before the emergence of the first substantial merger wave 
64  after the notorious battle for “British Aluminium Ltd”, conducted between the US Reynolds Metal Company, in partnership with 
U.K.-based Tube Investments (“TI-Reynolds”), and the Aluminium Company of America (“Alcoa”). The analysis of the case can be 
found in Armour and Skeel, p.1758 
65 Ibid, pp.1759-1760 
66 namely during the second merger wave 
67 Such as Jim Slater and James Goldsmith, as stated in Pazarskis, Eleftheriadis, Drogalas, and Christodoulou, p.10  
68 This wave was characterized by the abolition of exchange controls and the privatization of state-owned companies, measures 
taken by M. Thatcher’s government 
69 In particular, “differential voting rights, managements’ ability to limit voting rights, pyramid corporate ownership structures , 
absence of one share-one vote, two-tier boards that cannot be easily changed by the acquirer, the presence of employee 
representatives on supervisory boards, resistance from trade unions, the obligation to negotiate with the target boards before 
launching an offer and the low disclosure threshold for target shares acquisitions”, are only a few of the reasons hindering hostile 
takeovers in EU level, according to Sudarsanam, p. 500 
70 However, unsolicited bids were also witnessed in the French banking sector, as stated in Sudarsanam, p. 500 
71 Bruner Robert (2006) 
72 Ibid. However, the hostile takeover was note completed, due to the withdrawal of the bid in 2007   
73 See Bösecke Kathrin (2009), “Value Creation in Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances”, Gabler, p. 128, in which it is stated that the 
takeover was, at last, prevented, after the intervention of the French government 
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theories focusing on hostile takeover’s rationale, as they will be further analyzed 
below.   
RATIONALE OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
In the absence of a comprehensive theory of all subsets of takeovers and taking into 
consideration empirical evidence74, both “friendly” and “hostile” takeovers, are mainly 
considered as effective tools to increase corporate value and shareholders’ wealth, as 
well as ensure efficient capital markets and managerial discipline75. Therefore, despite 
the various theories, the motives behind hostile takeovers can be generally segmented 
into three basic categories: strategic, operational and managerial.  
 
Regarding the first category, hostile takeovers, as well as “friendly” ones, enable the 
bidding company to achieve market entry or exit, business divestitures and 
development or promotion of new products. The improvement of the bidder’s market 
position76 through the efficient exploitation of the target company’s capabilities77, 
such as the innovative technology or experienced workforce, is also a possibility. 
Hostile takeovers, can, therefore, enhance the competitiveness of the bidding 
company by ensuring the effective allocation of recourses and its economic growth.  
 
Operational motives refer mainly to the synergy gains achieved through a hostile 
takeover. In particular, synergy is the notion under which the value and performance 
of two companies exceeds the sum of the separate individual parts78. Synergies are, 
moreover, divided into operating and financial. In operating synergies, the “combined” 
firms “increase their operating income and achieve higher growth”79, as they reduce 
their costs in administration, production and logistics, whereas they increase their 
revenues through cross- selling and complementarity of their “strengths and 
                                                 
74 Romano Roberta (1992), “A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation”, The Yale Journal on Regulation, Volume9, 
Issue 1, p. 120 
75 According to Schwert, p.2599, this last aim, namely the intention of the bidder to replace the inefficient management of the 
under-performing target, is deemed to be the only element which distinguishes “friendly” from “hostile” takeovers  
76 Gorzala, p.9 
77 Magnuson William(2009), “Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe: An institutional approach”, Pace International 
Law Review 205, Volume 21, Issue 1, p.208 
78 As clearly defined in Romano pp 125-126  
79 As stated in https://www.divestopedia.com/definition/5010/operating-synergy 
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weaknesses”80.On the other hand, financial synergies refer to the optimization of the 
“financial metric” of the combined corporations, such as revenue, debt capacity, cost 
of capital, profitability, tax benefits etc.81 
Hostile takeovers may also serve as a method to achieve managerial discipline. In the 
fear of losing its job, the management of the target company will improve its 
performance, to prove the takeover unnecessary. It will, therefore, seek to minimize 
inefficiencies and raise the share price, a fact which will discourage possible 
bidders82.It must be noted, that the replacement of the target company’s management 
is deemed to be the only motive which differentiates “friendly” from “hostile” 
takeovers83.  
Such a replacement seems, though, essential in cases of under-performing companies, 
as well as in cases where the interests of the management collide with the ones of the 
shareholders, leading to conflicts regarding the best corporate strategy84. In such an 
occasion, the threat of a hostile takeover may not only enhance the managers’ 
efficiency, but also lead to the alignment of their incentives with the shareholders’ 
interests85.  
Taking all the above into consideration, we shall conclude that hostile takeovers are 
efficient mechanisms to improve the company’s strategic position, exploit synergy 
gains and exercise corporate control. Finally, both friendly and hostile takeovers 
increase market efficiency, by allowing the buyout of underpriced corporations. Under 
                                                 
80 Gorzala, p.9 
81 As stated in https://www.divestopedia.com/definition/5005/financial-synergy 
82 Maguson p. 209 
83 Schwert p.2599 
84 For instance, the board of directors may seek to enlarge the business to enhance the company’s power and prestige, as well as 
attain financial awards, if the latter is stipulated in the company’s compensation scheme. However, by focusing on “empire 
building”, managers may follow corporate strategies which neither aim at the best allocation of recourses nor ensure the 
maximization of shareholders’ wealth 
85 Gorzala pp.10· Interesting are the empirical findings presented by Martin Kenneth J. and McConnell John J. (1991), “Corporate 
Performance, Corporate takeovers, and Management turnovers”, the Journal of Finance, Volume 46 (XLVI), Issue 2, p.686, 
regarding the effectivity in replacing the management and the disciplinary effect in case the management remains in position after 
the completion of the takeover. According to this view “Those targets in which the top manager is not replaced the following the 
takeover are performing about as well as the average firm in their industry and are thus performing well relative to the market. 
Contrarily, those targets in which the top manager departs shortly after the takeover are performing significantly worse than the 
average firm in their industry, but are not performing significantly worse than the market. In turn, the targets of takeovers in 
which the top manager is replaced are performing significantly worse than the targets in which the top manager remains in place 
following the takeover. Overall, these results are consistent with the argument that takeovers play an important role in controlling 
corporate managers and aligning their incentives with stockholders' interests” 
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the theory of marketing myopia86, a corporation’s shares may be mispriced, as 
investors may overvalue short term profits and undervalue long term gains. The 
acquirer of such company benefits, therefore, from the difference between the real 
and the market value of the acquired company. Such takeovers are obviously 
disadvantageous for the shareholders of the target company, however, shareholders, 
in general, gain better market information87. 
                                                 
86 The theory of marketing myopia was initially expressed in Levitt Theodore (1960) ,“Marketing Myopia”, Harvard Business 
Review, July-August, pp.45-56. For a complete explanation of the relation between the marketing myopia theory and takeovers 
see Romano pp.144-145 
87 Magnuson, pp.209-210 
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DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
The vast expansion of hostile takeovers gave rise to the development of defensive 
measures, which seek to protect the interests of the target company, secure the 
target’s board independence or achieve a more profitable offer. These measures can 
be either proactive or reactive, depending on whether they aim to prevent or rebut a 
hostile takeover. 
PROACTINE DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
Proactive defensive measures are implemented before the occurrence of any 
“aggressive” takeover tactic, mainly of a tender offer, aiming to prevent a hostile 
takeover. The most commonly known proactive defensive measures are “the 
staggered board”, “the super majority amendment” the “poison pill” and the “golden 
parachutes”, as briefly discussed below.  
THE STAGGERED BOARD DEFENSE 
This measure88 is one of the most common preventative defensive strategies in the 
US89, seeking to incommode the change of the corporate control of the target 
company. By amending the articles of association, the target’s board may be divided 
into separate classes, whose term in office concludes at a different interval90. 
Consequently, directors cannot be replaced instantly, namely at a single shareholders’ 
meeting, a fact which delays the acquirer from gaining the corporate control91. Such a 
delay is often accompanied by extra expenditures, which make the target company 
less “attractive”92.  
 
                                                 
88 Also known as the classified board defense 
89 The measure does not apply in the UK, as the UK corporate Governance Code provides that the directors of FTSE-350 companies 
should be re-elected annually, as stated in Gullifer Louise and Payne Jennifer (2015), “Corporate Finance Law-Principles and 
Policy”, Second Edition, Hart Publishing, pp.530-531. Furthermore, the measure is also almost unknown in the Continental Europe, 
where “a shareholder or group of shareholders can convene a meeting and then dismiss all directors by a mere majority vote, as 
stated in Cools Sofie (2005), “The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers” Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Volume 30, Issue 3, p.750     
90 Mick, Bryan S. (1989), “Corporate Takeovers: Defensive Techniques Utilized against Raiders”, Creighton Law Review, Volume 22, 
Issue 3, p.706   
91 Gaughan p.198-199, where it is also stated that “under most state laws the maximum classes of directors are three”, 
consequently,“in a proxy contest staggered boards require insurgents to win more than one proxy fight at two successive 
shareholder meetings to gain control of the target” 
92 Zarin Samim and Yang Erik, p.15 
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The “staggered board” is considered  a weak defensive strategy93, as it does not hinder 
the acquisition of a controlling block of the target’s shares, but only delays the acquirer 
from exercising its voting rights94. Furthermore, in cases where the bidder has 
obtained the majority of the target company’s shares95, he may be able to gain control 
of the board instantly, as the remaining board members would be expected to resign, 
since they would have little legitimacy96 and would be unable to accomplish much 
against the will of the controlling shareholder97.Consequently, this tactic shall be 
implemented in combination with other defensive measures, such as the poison pill98, 
in order to be effective.  
 
Except from the dubious effectiveness, there has also been an on-going debate 
regarding the impact of the staggered board on shareholder wealth, with the most 
recent of the conducted researches concluding that the implementation of the 
measure decreases the firm’s value99. These findings support the contemporary 
policies of leading institutional investors and corporate governance activists, who are 
in favor of board de-staggering100.  
THE SUPER-MAJORITY AMENDMENT 
The “super-majority amendment”, seeks also to delay the hostile bidder from gaining 
control over the target company, as well as to protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Under this measure, the articles of association of the target company 
are amended to specify that takeovers must be approved by an extra-large majority 
(typically of 80%101) of votes102 . Such a provision is usually accompanied by a “board-
                                                 
93  Clark Robert C. (1986), “Corporate Law”, Little, Brown, p.576  
94 Bebchuk Lucian, Coates John C.  IV and Subramanian Guhan (2002), “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy”, Stanford Law Review, Volume 54, Issue 5, p.903 
95 In case the acquirer has exceeded 90% of the target’s stock, Under the EU Directive on takeover bids {Council Directive 2004/25, 
2004, O.J. (L 142) 12(EC)} the effectivity of this measure is diluted under the squeeze-out right (art.15) 
96 as the controlling shareholder does not support their stay 
97 Bebchuk Lucian, Coates John C.  IV and Subramanian Guhan, p.904 
98 Ibid 
99 See Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Cohen Alma (2005), “The costs of entrenched boards” Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 78, 
Issue 2, 2005, pp. 409-433; Masulis Ronald, Wang Cong, Xie Fei (2007), “Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns”, The Journal 
of Finance Volume 62, Issue 4, pp. 1851-1889; Olubunmi Faleye (2007), “Classified boards, Firm value, and Managerial 
entrenchment”, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 83, Issue 2, pp. 501-529; Cohen Alma and  Wang Charles C.Y. (2013), 
“How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment”, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 
110, Issue 3, pp. 627–641.  
100 Bruner (2004), p.835 
101 Gaughan ,p.200 
102 Bruner (2004), p.835 
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out” clause, allowing the target’s board to waive the requirement, mainly, in cases of 
friendly bids103.  
 
The super-majority amendment is considered a mild defense, as the bidder may 
respond by making a tender offer for the whole firm104. Consequently, the defense is 
effective only in partial bids105.Alternatively the bidder may acquire a simple majority 
of the outstanding shares, and use its voting rights to rescind the super-majority 
provision106, unless such a rescission is also subject to a supermajority vote107. 
Furthermore, as this provision only delays the consummation of the bid108, it shall be 
used in conjunction with other defenses to hinder a hostile takeover109. Finally, 
regarding the impact on shareholders’ wealth, it has been found that the 
announcement of the measure may slightly reduce shareholders’ wealth110, however, 
in a long-term assessment, its implication does not have adverse consequences for the 
firm or its shareholders111.    
THE POISON PILL DEFENSE 
Invented in 1982 by Martin Lipton112, the poison pill113 was “proven to be the most 
powerful and effective of all defensive measures”114. Under this strategy, a new class 
of securities or rights is issued as dividend115 by the target company to its shareholders 
upon the occurrence of a triggering event, namely of a hostile takeover attempted by a 
                                                 
103 Depamphilis p.117; see also Bruner (2004) p.835 
104 Ruback Richard S. in Auerbach Alan J. (1987), “Mergers and Acquisitions”, University of Chicago Press, p.57.    
105 Gaughan, p.200. However, in Europe, under the mandatory bid rule (art.5) of the European Takeover Directive, the bids are 
uniform. 
106 Bragg Steven M.(2009), “Mergers and Acquisitions-A Condensed Practitioner’s Guide”, John Wiley & Sons. Inc, p.36-37. This 
tactic is also forbidden under the mandatory bid rule of the Takeover Directive, as analysed in chapter 3 
107 Bragg (2009), p.37 
108 Bruner (004) p.835 
109 According to Ambrose Brent W. and Megginson William L. (1992), “The role of asset structure, ownership structure, and 
takeover defences in determining acquisition likelihood”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University 
Press, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp.575-589, companies which implement the super-majority measure are insignificantly less likely to 
attract a takeover bid 
110 Linn Scott and McConnell John J. (1983),” An empirical investigation of the impact of “antitakeover” amendments on common 
stock prices”, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 11, Issues 1-4, 1983, pages 361-399, who state that this reduction is 
estimated up to 5%  
111 Johnson Mark S. and Rao Ramesh P. (1999), “The Impact of Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments on Expectations of Future 
Earnings and Takeover Activity”, Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Volume 20, Issue 2, pp. 75-86   
112 To defend El Paso Electric from General American Oil (Gaughan, p.186) 
113 also referred to as “Shareholder Rights Plans” 
114 Kenyon-Slade S. (2003), “Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK”, Oxford University Press, p.333 
115 Micheletto Robert C. (1987), “Poison Pill: A Panacea for the Hostile Corporate Takeover”, The John Marshall Law Review, 
Volume 21, Issue 1, p.110  
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tender offer for a large fraction of the target’s shares116 or by an acquisition117  which 
exceeds a threshold percentage of the target’s voting capital118. Even though the 
measure is characterized as proactive, it can be also implemented after the onset of 
the hostile bid119. 
 
The poison pill has multiple variations, as it has gone through three generations of 
development, establishing the preferred stock plans120, the flip-in121 and the flip-
over122 poison pills. Additional variations constitute the back-end plans123, the poison 
puts124 and the chewable poison pills125. In general, the poison pill provisions define 
that the measure is effective for a specific period126 , whereas they also contain an 
“escape clause”, under which it can be redeemed at the board’s discretion and within 
a short period127 after the occurrence of the triggering event128.  
 
The proponents of this defense argue, that it hinders a hostile takeover, preserving 
time and flexibility to the target’s board to negotiate a better offer129. However, the 
measure has been criticized for leading often to litigation and for facilitating 
management entrenchment130. Regarding its effect on shareholders’ wealth, the 
findings of the researchers vary, leading to a controversy as to whether the adoption 
of the measure benefits or not the target’s shareholders131. 
                                                 
116 Ruback Richard S. in Auerbach Alan J., p.58 
117 The acquirer is often referred to as an “interested person” 
118 Bruner (2004), p.838 
119 DePamphilis , p.110.Consequently, the measure may be also regarded as reactive  
120 It is the first generation of poison pills. Under this measure, the target issues convertible preferred stock as a pro rata dividend 
to all holders of its common stock, as stated in Micheletto   p.110  
121 This measure constitutes the second generation of poison pills. The flip-in provision, entitles the target’s shareholders to 
purchase common shares of the target firm at nominal value, as defined in Bruner (2004), p.839  
122 This is the third generation of poison pills and it is implemented only in case the bidder, after having acquired the voting 
majority of the target’s shares, attempts to merge the target with the purchasing firm. In this case, the flip-over provision entitles 
the target’s shareholders to purchase common shares of the surviving firm at nominal value, as defined in Bruner (2004), p.838    
123 According to this measure, the shareholders receive a dividend of rights enabling them to exchange these rights for cash or 
senior debt securities at a specific price set by the target’s board, as defined in DePamphilis , p.112   
124 The poison-puts provisions trigger the repayment of debt at or above par value in the event of a hostile takeover, as defined in 
Bruner (2004), p.842 
125 This is a type of poison pill which is void in the face of a certain event, namely when a fully financed offer at a substantial 
premium to the target’s current share price is made, a defined in DePamphilis , p.112    
126 Usually for 10 years, unless extended by the target’s board, as set in Bruner (2004), p.838 
127 Usually within 10 days 
128 Bruner (2004), p.839 
129 Ibid, p.838; see also DePamphilis p.112 
130 Bruner (2004), p.838 
131 For the various researches see Malatesta Paul H.  and Walking Ralph A. (1988), ‘‘Poison Pills Securities: Stockholder Wealth, 
Profitability and Ownership Structure,’’ Journal of Financial Economics Volume 20, Issue 1/2, pp. 347–376; Ryngaert Michael 
(1988), ‘‘The Effects of Poison Pill Securities on Stockholder Wealth,’’ Journal of Financial Economics Volume 20, Issue ½,  pp.377–
417; Comment Robert and Schwert G. William (1995), ‘‘Poison or Placebo: Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of 
Modern Antitakeover Measures,’’ Journal of Financial Economics Volume 39, Issue 1, pp. 3–43; 
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THE GOLDEN PARACHUTE DEFENSE 
Another well-known measure is the “golden parachute”, aiming at discouraging an 
unwanted takeover by contractually binding the target company to offer lucrative 
benefits132, to its top executives, who may lose their jobs in case of a hostile 
takeover133. The requirements which cumulatively enable the triggering of the golden 
parachute clause are usually the change of control over the company134 and the 
subsequent dismissal of the executive by the bidder, if this dismissal is outside the 
executive’s control135. The golden parachute defense is primarily characterized as a 
pro-active measure; however, it may be also implemented during a takeover battle136.  
 
 The aim of this tactic is to increase the acquisition costs, to render the target company 
less attractive. However, its effectiveness has been disputed, especially in large 
takeovers, as the cost of golden parachutes is a small percentage of the total purchase 
price137. Nevertheless, golden parachutes, by ensuring the retention of the target’s 
board, reduce the conflict of interests between directors and shareholders during a 
takeover, encouraging the first to negotiate higher takeover premiums with the bidder 
138. Finally, regarding the evaluation of the measure on its impact on shareholders’ 
wealth, there is a great divergence among the various researches139, while some of 
them distinguish based on the timing of the measure’s adoption140.  
                                                 
132 such as stock options, bonuses, heavy severance pay 
133 Kokot, Katerina S. (2006), “The art of Takeover Defense”, p.19, retrieved from: 
http://www.pwc.com/ua/en/assets/pwc_atd_eng.pdf 
134 According to DePamphilis p.118 the change in control exists when an acquirer accumulates more than a certain percentage of 
the target’s voting shares 
135 Ibid 
136 Gaughan, p.487 
137 Ibid 
138 Jensen Michael C. (1988), “Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 2, Issue 
1., p.39. The writer, however, states that the “benefits” offered to the target’s top executes after the implementation of the 
measure shall not be excessive, as it will lead the managers to sell the target at a very low price.  
139 See Lambert Richard A. and Larker David F.(1985), ‘‘Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision Making and Shareholder Wealth,’’ 
Journal of Accounting Economics, Volume 7, Issue 1-3, pp. 179–203; Machlin Judith, Choe Hyuk, and Miles James (1993), ‘‘The 
Effects of Golden Parachutes on Takeover Activity,’’ Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp. 861–876 ; Mogavero 
Damian J. and Toyne Michael F.(1995), “The Impact of Golden Parachutes on Fortune 500 Stock Returns: A Reexamination of the 
Evidence”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 34, Issue 4 , pp. 30-38 ; Davidson Wallace N. III, Pilger Theodore 
and Szakmary Andrew(1998), “Golden Parachutes, Board and Committee Composition, and Shareholder Wealth”, The Financial 
Review, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp.17-32 
140 Born Jeffery A., Trahan Emery A., Faria Hugo J. (1993) , “Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners, Management Entrenchers, or 
Takeover Bid Signals?”, The Journal of Financial Research, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp. 299-308; Hall Pamela L.(1998), ‘‘An Examination 
of Stock Returns to Firms Adopting Golden Parachutes Under Certain Conditions,’’ American Business Review, Volume 16, Issue 1,  
pp. 123–130  
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REACTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
Apart from the above measures, the target company can implement a variety of tactics 
to rebut the hostile takeover, the so- called reactive defensive measures. The most 
common measures of this category are the “Greenmail”, “the Crown Jewel”, the “Pac-
man”, the “White Knight”, “White Squire” and the “Lock- up” defenses, as they are 
further discussed below. 
THE GREENMAIL DEFENSE 
Constituting a neologism deriving from the words blackmail and greenbacks (i.e dollar 
bills)141 , the greenmail defense is a strategy142, under which the target company offers 
to repurchase a block of shares held by the acquirer at a premium143 over the stock 
price, in return for the acquirer’s agreement not to proceed to a hostile takeover. This 
agreement is often accompanied by a standstill agreement144, in which it is stated that 
the bidder will not be able to buy more shares for a specific period, usually for up to 
five years145. The measure is successful usually with bidders with short-term interests, 
whereas those who seek at a long-term corporate control would probably proceed to a 
hostile bid. 
 
Even though the greenmail defense succeeds in buying time for the management to 
proceed to corporate restructuring, it has received sharp criticism for being mainly 
contrary to the business ethics146.Concretely, it constitutes a discriminatory payment 
and a violation of the implied duty of fairness to all shareholders, as the latter do not 
have the right to sell their shares to the company at premium147, a fact which often 
results to legal disputes148. Furthermore, it facilitates “management entrenchment”, 
enabling the target’s managers to pay the greenmailer and preserve their jobs, 
                                                 
141 McSweeney Brendan in Faulkner David, Teerikangas Satu and Joserh Richard J.(2012), “The Handbook of Mergers and 
Acquisitions”, Oxford University Press, p. 297.  
142 also known as the “targeted share repurchase” strategy, as stated in Bruner (2004), p. 849 
143 The amount paid is colloquially called a “bon voyage bonus” or “goodbye kiss”, as stated in McSweeney Brendan in Faulkner 
David, Teerikangas Satu and Joserh Richard J., p.297  
144 The standstill agreement may be also used by the management which offered inside information to the bidder during the 
negotiation stage, to prevent the latter from addressing the shareholders with an offer which is detrimental for the interests of 
the incumbent management (McSweeney Brendan in Faulkner David, Teerikangas Satu and Joserh Richard J , p. 298). This method, 
however, raises the issue of the principal-agent conflict, as it is contrary to the fiduciary duties of the management.  
145 Zarin and Yang, p.21   
146 Bruner (2004), p.23 
147 Ibid 
148 Ibid, p.849 
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whereas it results to the transfer of wealth from the remaining shareholders, a fact 
which is also contrary to the target’s economic interests. Moreover, this tactic might 
pave the way for further takeover attempts149, as it is a sign that the target is 
vulnerable150. Consequently, due to the above problems greenmail in some 
jurisdictions is debarred, discouraged or subject to shareholders’ authorization151.   
THE CROWN JEWEL DEFENSE 
The “crown jewel” can be defined as the most profitable asset of the target company, 
such as a highly profitable division, a revolutionary product, a subsidiary, or a large tax-
loss carryover, therefore it constitutes the basic incentive for a takeover152. Under the 
crown jewel defense, the target company decides to sell-off the entire or part of its 
most valuable assets153 in the event of a hostile takeover. By doing so, it becomes less 
“attractive” and forces the withdrawal of the bid. Usually, the “crown jewels” are sold 
to a friendly third party, also referred to as a “white knight”, which agrees to resell 
them to the target company at a fixed price after the acquiring company has 
withdrawn the bid154. 
  
Although the “crown jewel” defense seems prima facie effective, it might be proven 
risky in some respects, as the sale of the most valuable assets of a company 
jeopardizes its whole operation155. Furthermore, in case of a sale to a “white knight”, 
the later needs to guarantee the resale to the target company at a fixed price. Finally, 
it has been argued that the effectiveness of this defense depends on the sum of money 
received from the sale of the assets. Concretely, if the target company has managed to 
                                                 
149 Ibid 
150 This was the case of Walt Disney Productions,1984, as described in Bruner (2004), pp.22-26. However, the empirical evidence is 
mixed on whether the greenmail defense attracts further hostile takeovers. According to Mikkelson Wayne H.  and Ruback Richard 
S. (1991), “Targeted Repurchases and Common Stock Returns”, the RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 22, Issue 4, pp.544-561, 
there is no connection between the greenmail defense and the future hostile takeovers, whereas the opposite view is expressed in 
Ambrose Brent W. and Megginson William L.(1992), “The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in 
Determining Acquisition Likelihood”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp. 575-589 
151 McSweeney Brendan in Faulkner David, Teerikangas Satu and Joserh Richard J , p. 298. According to Bruner (2004), the U.S 
Congress imposed a 50% tax on the gains of the greenmailer. 
152 Reiser, Leonard I. (1984), "Corporate Takeovers: A Glossary of Terms and Tactics," Case & Comment, November/December, pp. 
35-51   
153 According to Underhill William and Austmann Andreas in Payne Jennifer(2002), “Takeovers in English and German Law”, Hart 
Publishing, p.106, the crown jewel defense involves the sale of that part of the target of which the bidder is seeking to acquire 
control.   
154 Corelli Angelo (2016), “Analytical Corporate Finance”, Springer International Publishing, p.448 
155 Ibid 
  -20- 
sale its assets at a high price and therefore received a large sum of money, it would 
potentially become even more “attractive” to the acquirer156.  
THE “PAC-MAN” DEFENSE 
Named after the famous videogame, the “Pac-Man” defense may be defined as a 
counter-purchase attempted by the target company against its hostile bidder157. 
Concretely, to rebut the hostile bid, the target company starts to purchase large 
amounts of the bidder’s shares. However, in some cases, it will suffice for the target 
company to buy even a small fraction of shares of the potential acquirer, which will 
enable it to initiate legal claims against the latter in the capacity of minority 
shareholder158. 
  
The main advantages of this measure are that it demonstrates aggressive resistance, 
raises the target’s possibility of success, as well as it constitutes one bargaining chip in 
negotiating with the bidder159. However, this tactic has three main disadvantages160: 
first, its implementation is a sign that the target acknowledges the desirability of the 
combination of the two firms, consequently, claims and defenses that the target would 
otherwise make are eliminated; secondly, due to the role reversal, the target/counter-
bidder becomes subject to the various defensive measures that the other part may 
implement; finally, there is uncertainty on how the defense concludes, as, at the end 
of the contest, both, target/counter-bidder and bidder own the majority of the other, 
without  being clear who is in control161.  
 
“Pac-Man” constitutes an extreme defense162 which is often threatened but is rarely 
used163. Consequently, due to the aforementioned problems and its rare use, the 
                                                 
156 Ibid 
157 Kokot, p.20   
158 Ibid 
159 Bruner (2004) p.846 
160 Ibid 
161 Fleischer Arthur Jr. and Sussman Alexander R.( 1995), “Takeover Defense”, 5th edition, New York: Aspen Law &Business, p.9–29 
and 9-30 
162 According to Gaughan p.238 it is a “doomsday machine” 
163 The measure first appeared in 1980, in the hostile takeover attempt of Midway Manufacturing Company. In 1982 it was used in 
the following cases: American General/NLT, Mesa Petroleum/ Cities Service, Pabst/ Olympia Brewing, General Cinema/ Heublein, 
and Bendix/Martin-Marietta. Other famous cases in which the measure was used are E-II/American Brands (1988), Elf 
Aquitaine/Totalfina (1999) and Shorewood Corporation /Chesapeake (1999). 
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measure alone is not always effective, therefore, it shall be used in conjunction with 
other defenses.  
THE WHITE KNIGHT, THE WHITE SQUIRE AND THE LOCK-UP DEFENSES 
These measures require the involvement of third parties for the repulse of the hostile 
bidder. Under the “white knight” defense, a friendly firm agrees to acquire the 
majority stake in the target company to “save” the latter from a hostile acquisition164. 
If the friendly company does not acquire the majority stake of the target company, but 
a smaller portion of its shares, without taking control of the target, it is characterized 
as a “white squire”165. Similar to the above defenses is the “Lock-up” defense, under 
which the “white knight” is granted options to purchase either a significant amount of 
stock, often at a bargain price, or certain valuable assets, even the crown-jewels, of the 
target company, as an attempt of the latter to deter the hostile bidder166.  
 
The criteria under which a company is regarded as a “white knight” are its friendly 
intentions, the historical good relationships and the belief of better synergies between 
the two companies. Furthermore, a “white knight” is expected not to proceed to the 
dismissal of the employees of the target company167, including the members of the 
board168. Moreover, especially the lock-up defense has been found to have a positive 
impact on shareholders’ wealth169. 
 
The common outcome of the aforementioned measures, is that the target company is 
partly or in whole acquired by the “white knight”, therefore it loses its independence. 
It manages, however, to escape from a hostile takeover, which would lead to a greater 
restructuring170. Consequently, the above advantages render these methods effective, 
                                                 
164 According to Bruner (2004), p.848, the reasons behind the acquisition of the target company by a “white knight” may stem 
from the latter’s desire to acquire synergistic gains or maintain a strategic relationship with the target, or from purely financial 
considerations, as indicated in the acquisition of Berkshire Hathaway’s by Scott & Fetzer  
165 Bruner(2004), p.848   
166 Mick, p.712; see also Gaughan, p.219 and DePamphilis p.120, who states that the lockup serves as a protection to the white 
knight in case a bidding war ensues   
167 Zarin and Yang, p.20   
168 a fact which leads to the conclusion that the above defenses may facilitate management entrenchment, as stated in Gaughan 
(2011), p.219, with regard to the lockup defense 
169 Birch Timothy R. (2001) ‘‘Locking Out Rival Bidders: The Use of Lockup Options in Corporate Mergers,’’ Journal of Financial 
Economics Volume 60, No. 1, pp. 103–141 
170 Zarin and Yang, p.20 
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if, however, a “white knight” is found, a procedure which is more complicated than it 
may look.  
 
Concluding this chapter, it should be underlined that the above measures constitute 
only a fraction of the various mechanisms applicable by the target company in the 
event of a hostile takeover. Due to the various deficiencies, the above measures are 
usually adopted in combination to be effective. However, it shall be underlined that 
their enactment depends on the applicable national law. 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US AND EU TAKEOVER LAW ON 
TENDER OFFERS 
Even though hostile takeovers are a global phenomenon, their regulation varies among 
nations. This lack of convergence becomes apparent after the examination of the two 
model systems applied in the United States and in Europe, which follow diametrically 
opposed approaches on the regulation of hostile takeovers attempted by means of a 
tender offer. 
THE US FRAMEWORK 
Due to the system of federalism, takeovers in the United States are regulated both at 
federal and state level, each of which focuses on different aspects of takeovers. 
Concretely, securities regulation, tender offers and antitrust law fall within the scope 
of federal law, whereas issues of corporate law, such as corporate charters and bylaws, 
directors’ duties and takeover defense, are governed by state law171. Consequently, for 
the issues falling in the second category, there are 50 different sources of US corporate 
law. In cases of directors’ fiduciary duties, however, corporate law in the US has been 
heavily influenced by Delaware case law, not only because Delaware is the state where 
most of US public listed corporations are incorporated in 172 , but also due to the 
expertise and flexibility of the Delaware Court of Chancery173.  
 
The following analysis will focus on the core elements of Williams Act, which regulates 
tender offers at federal level, whereas regarding state level regulations, the Delaware’s 
case law on directors’ fiduciary duties and the three generations of State Anti-
Takeover Statutes will be analyzed. 
 
                                                 
171 Wang Xiaofan(2013), “Takeover law in the UK, US and China: A comparative analysis and recommendations for Chinese 
takeover law reform”, PhD thesis, Salford Law School, p.76, retrieved from http://usir.salford.ac.uk/30240/  
172 In the official website of the State of Delaware http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml  it is stated that “more than 
50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States including 64% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal 
home” 
173 Magnuson, p. 214 
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THE WILLIAMS ACT (1968) 
Constituting an amendment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934174, the Williams 
Act, (1968), marks the modern era of federal regulation of tender offers175 , by 
establishing the mandatory disclosure of information and the procedural requirements 
of tender offers. Even though it applies to all types of tender offers, including friendly, 
hostile and self-tender offers176, it does not provide a concrete definition of the term 
“tender offer”, leaving its determination to case law177. 
  
Section 13(d) of the Act and SEC Regulation 13D aim to provide an early warning for 
the target company regarding a pending bid, even if the bid is not eventually made178. 
Under them, if the acquisition of shares exceeds the threshold of 5% or more, the 
acquirer is obliged to disclose certain information by filing a Schedule 13D with the SEC 
within 10 days after reaching this threshold179. This information includes: the 
acquirer’s background and identity; its source of funds; the purpose of the acquisition 
and any further plans, such as a possible liquidation of the target or major business 
changes; the acquirer’s holdings in the target company and any past contracts with the 
target180. 
  
Furthermore, Section 14(d) and SEC Regulation 14D set the basic procedural rules for 
tender offers, “so long as upon consummation of the tender offer the bidder would 
beneficially own more than five percent of the class of securities subject to the 
offer”181. To make a tender offer, the acquirer must file with the SEC a “Tender Offer 
                                                 
174 Adding new §§13(d)-(f) and 14(d)-(f)  
175 Magnuson, pp.213 et sec 
176 According to DePamphilis, p.54, self-tender offers are those “undertaken by a firm to repurchase its own stock”  
177 In Wellman v. Dickinson {475 F Supp 783 (SDNY 1979), aff’ d 632 F 2d 355 (2d Cir 1982)}, the court set out the eight factors (the 
so called Wellman factors) constituting a tender offer, which are the following : 1. there is an active and widespread solicitation of 
public shareholders for shares of the target company; 2. the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the target 
company’s shares; 3. the offer to purchase is made at a premium over the existing market price; 4. the terms of the offer are firm 
rather than negotiated; 5. the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares and possibly  specifying a maximum 
number of shares; 6. the offer is open for only a limited time period; 7. the offeree is subject to pressure to sell shares; 8. there are 
public announcements of a purchasing program that precede or are coincident with a rapid accumulation of large amounts of 
shares of the target company. It shall be noted that the last factor was added after the decision on Wellman v. Dickinson case. It is 
argued, however, that not all these factors have to be met to implement the Williams Act, whereas the courts have added more 
tests to define the existence of a tender offer. 
178 DePamphilis, p.54 
179 See Section 13(d)(1) of Williams Act {15 U.S.C §78m (d)(1)} and Rule 13d(1) of SEC Regulation 13D{17 C.F.R §240.13d-1}  
180 See Section 13(d)(1)(A)-(E) of Williams Act { U.S.C §78m (d)(1) (A)-(E)} and Schedule 13D  {17 C.F.R §240.13d-101} 
181 As stated in “SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance on Mini-Tender Offers and Limited Partnership Tender Offers”, 
electronically available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-43069.htm#P49_6740, referring to  Section 14(d)(1) of the 
Exchange Act, as amended by Williams Act [15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1)] and Rule 14d-1(a) of Regulation D [17 CFR 240.14d-1(a)] 
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Statement on Schedule TO”182, in which it discloses similar information requested 
under Schedule 13D183.From its part, the target board is obliged to fill with the SEC a 
Schedule 14D-9184, also called solicitation/recommendation statement, in which it 
discloses its recommendation about the bid185, in agreement with the below analyzed 
Rule 14e-2 of SEC Regulation. 
 
 Section 14(d) of the Act and SEC Regulation 14 D set also the shareholder rights, under 
which the acquiring firm must purchase all the shares tendered at the offer price or at 
least on a pro rata basis186, unless the number of the tendered shares is smaller than 
the one requested in the tender offer187. Shareholders are also entitled to withdraw 
their shares at any time, if the tender offer is still open188. Furthermore, under the 
“best price rule”189, all the tendering shareholders are paid the same per share price. 
However, in cases where the acquirer makes a tender offer for all the outstanding 
shares aiming to reach at least a certain threshold, once the threshold is met, the 
acquirer can purchase the remaining shares at any price190. 
 
Moreover, in line with Section 14(e) of the Act191, Regulation 14E provides the basic 
procedural protections, applicable to all tender offers, including those in which the 
threshold of 5% is not met (mini tender offers). Under Rule 14e-1 of the Regulation, 
the tender offer must remain open for 20 days192, with a possibility of extension of 10 
days, following an increase or decrease by more than 2% either in the class of 
securities being sought or in the consideration offered193. Regarding the target’s 
obligations, Rule 14e-2 obliges the board to state its position about the offer within 10 
business days after the offer begins194. 
                                                 
182  Rule 14d-3(a)(1) of SEC Regulation 14D [17 CFR §240.14d-3(a)(1)] and Schedule TO {17 CFR 240.14d-100} 
183 See 17 CFR 240.14d-100, namely the bidder’s background information, source of funds, business plans regarding the target, 
extent of ownership in the target, past contracts with the target, antitrust problems and other relevant information. 
184 Rule 14(d)-9 of Regulation 14D {17 CFR 240.14d-9} and Schedule 14D-9 {17 CFR 240.14d-101} 
185 required under Rule 14e-2, which will be analyzed below 
186 Section 14(d)-6 of the Act {15 U.S.C 78n(d)(6)} and Rule 14d-8 of SEC Regulation 14D [17 CFR 240.14d-8] 
187 DePamphilis, p. 55 
188 Section 14(d)-5 of the Act {15 U.S.C 78n(d)(5)} and Rule 14d-7 of SEC Regulation 14D [17 CFR 240.14d-7] 
189 Rule 14d-10 of SEC Regulation 14D {17 CFR 240.14d-10} 
190 unless it is evidenced that information regarding the tender offer has been withheld or misrepresented, as stated in 
DePamphilis, p. 55; see also case In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation {Consolidated C.A No.18700 Court of Chancery, 
Delaware} 
191 15 U.S.C 78n(e), which prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative acts during a tender offer, 
192 17 CFR 240.14e-1(a) 
193 17 CFR 240.14e-1(b) 
194 See also Rule 14d-9 of SEC Regulation 14D  
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Despite the importance of the above rules, Williams Act, as well as federal regulation 
in general, covers only a small part of takeover legal framework. The fiduciary duties of 
the target’s board and the permitted defensive measures are governed by the 
corporate law and the judicial decisions of the state in which the target is 
incorporated. However, the foundations of the target directors’ response in a hostile 
takeover have been defined by a series of cases in the State of Delaware, which “carry 
influence beyond the state’s borders”195 and therefore constitute an inextricable part 
of American tender offer regulation. 
DELAWARE’S CASE LAW ON FIDUCIARY DYTIES AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
The review of the board’s efforts to deter a hostile takeover had been for a long time a 
difficult task, as the application of the usual standards, namely the business judgement 
rule196 and the intrinsic fairness test197, did not seem quite appropriate198. To achieve a 
middle ground between these theories, the Delaware courts developed the so called 
“intermediate standard”199 , through a series of rulings beginning in the 1985. 
 
The first case addressing the “intermediate standard” was the Unocal Corp v Mesa 
Petroleum Co200, in which the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that directors of 
the target company are “of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest”201, as they 
face the possibility of replacement after the completion of the takeover. Therefore, in 
order to decide upon the legitimacy of the defensive measures, the court applied a  
                                                 
195 Magnuson, p.214 
196 Originated in case Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 61 F. Supp. 905 (D.C. Pa. 1945), this doctrine states that the decisions made 
by the company’s directors are protected as long as they are made (1) in good faith, (2) with the care that a reasonably prudent 
person would use, and (3) with the reasonable belief that they are acting in the best interests of the corporation ( as stated in 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/business_judgment_rule ), even though , in retrospect, these decisions were proven unsound 
or erroneous, as set in McMillan Lori, “ The Business Judgement Rule as an Immunity Doctrine”,  William and Mary Business Law 
Review, Volume 4, Issue 2, 2013, p.526          
197 Originated in case Weinberger v. UOP Inc., Supreme Court of Delaware,457 A.2d 701, (1983), this doctrine states that the 
directors of the target are obliged to prove that the challenged action was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders: fair 
in terms of fair dealing and fair price, as stated in  Bruner (2004), p.718 
198 Gilson Ronald J., Kraakman Reiner (1989), “Delaware’s intermediate Standard for defensive tactics, is there substance to the 
proportionality review”, The Business Lawyer, Volume 44, Issue 2., p.247 
199 Or “proportionality test” Ibid p.248. It shall be noted, that in 1964, before the boom of hostile activity in the 1980s, the 
Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue in Cheff v. Mathes case {Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964)}, 
setting the policy conflict/ primary purpose test, under which the standard of review for defensive tactics was defined by the 
motives of the directors. If the management could demonstrate an argument regarding corporate policy with the possible 
acquirer, it was presumed to act from business considerations rather than self-interest. As the management was always able to 
prove policy conflict with the acquirer, this test “reduced to a routine application of the business judgement standard” (Gilson and 
Kraakman, pp.250-251). However, this case served as a predecessor of the famous cases of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
Revlon v. MacAndrews, and Paramount v. Time. 
200Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Corp 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985)   
201 493 A 2d 946, section IV.A at 955 (Del 1985)   
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two-tier test: first the directors had to show that they “had reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed” and they  
needed to satisfy that burden "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation"202; 
secondly, the defensive measure should have been “reasonable in relation to the 
threat posed”203. Once these two requirements were met, the defensive measures 
adopted by the board were considered as valid. The Unocal test modified the classic 
business judgement rule204 and since its formulation, it has been frequently applied by 
Delaware courts in assessing the board’s behavior in cases the latter aims at preserving 
the target’s independence205. 
 
Soon after the adoption of the Unocal test, the Supreme Court of Delaware restricted 
the directors’ freedom of action through its decision on Revlon Inc v MacAndrews and 
Forbes Holdings Inc206 case. At the first instance, the Delaware Court of Chancery held 
that “once the breakup of Revlon became inevitable… the board [had] to view its 
primary role as the promoter of bids, with price the dominant consideration” 207. In 
line with this view, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he directors’ role 
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting 
the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company”208. Under the Revlon 
duties, which apply in case of an inevitable sale of the target company, directors shall 
use defensive measures only to promote the “auction process” and achieve the 
highest price by favoring one bidder over another. However, in its ruling on Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc.209, the Delaware Supreme Court gave more leeway to the 
board, by stating that even in cases where the target would be inevitably sold, the 
consideration of factors other from the offer price, such as the amount of information 
available to shareholders or the conditions and the timing of the offer, may justify the 
implementation of defensive measures. 
 
                                                 
202 Ibid 
203 Ibid 
204 Therefore, is also known as the “enhanced business judgment rule” 
205 See Wang, p. 104 and 106.  Under this test, the Delaware Supreme Court accepted the validity of the poison pill defense in case 
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc {500 A2d.1346, at 1357 (Del. 1985)} 
206 Revlon Inc v MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings Inc, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
207 MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc v Revlon Inc, 501 A 2d 1239 (Del Ch 1985), 1250-1251 
208 Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc, 506 A 2d 173 (Del 1986), 182 
209 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc,571 A.2d 1140 (Del.1989) 
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The directors’ duties and the availability of defensive measures have been further 
clarified in two more decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in the 1990s210. In 
Paramount Communications Inc v QVC Network Inc211, the Court stated that directorial 
defensive measures are subject to enhanced scrutiny, only when the Revlon duties 
apply, namely, once the sale of the target corporation is inevitable212. Moreover, in 
Unitrin Inc v. American General Corporation213, the Court expanded the directors’ 
margin of discretion, as it recognized the validity of the defensive tactics, if the latter 
meet two requirements: they are not “draconian”214 and they are within a “range of 
reasonableness”215. 
 
These cases lead to the conclusion, that the target’s directors enjoy a large margin of 
discretion in the application of defensive measures against a hostile takeover, if they 
act “in good faith”, after “reasonable investigation” and the adopted measures are not 
“draconian”. In case of the inevitable sale of the target company, the board is more 
restricted under the Revlon duties, however, this restriction does not hinder absolutely 
the implementation of takeover defenses. The above stated requirements constitute 
the “intermediate standard” between the business judgement rule and the intrinsic 
fairness test, however, this standard is closer to judicial deference than to judicial 
scrutiny216. 
 
In addition to state law fiduciary duties, a substantive part of takeover legislation at 
state level is covered by state anti-takeover statutes, the analysis of which follows. 
STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER STATUTES 
Resulting from intense lobbying and political pressure, state anti-takeover statutes aim 
at protecting in-state corporations from being taken over, especially by out-of-state 
acquirers217. These statutes were first adopted in the late 1960s and early 1970s218 
                                                 
210 Magnuson, p. 216 
211 Paramount Communications Inc v QVC Network Inc 637 A 2d 34 (Del 1994) 
212 637 A 2d at 45. It should be noted that the Revlon duties apply in case of (a) a change in corporate control; or (b)of  a breakup 
of the corporate entity {637 A 2d at 48}  
213 Unitrin Inc v. American General Corporation 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) 
214 According to this case, the defensive measures are “draconian”, if they are coercive or preclusive {651 A.2d at 1387} 
215 651 A.2d at 1388 
216 Magnuson, p.216 
217 Ibid 
218 Gaughan, p. 97 
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and, since then, they have gone through three generations of development. Despite 
their major differences, their key characteristics remain similar across the states.  
 
The first generation of state anti-takeover laws emerged shortly after the enactment 
of the Williams Act and its main objective was to enhance the protection of target 
companies against hostile bids by imposing procedural and substantive requirements 
on the bidders219. However, these statutes were proven problematic, as they enabled 
state administrators to review offers on various grounds, such as substantive fairness 
and adequacy of disclosures, hold a hearing to review the offers, and impose waiting 
periods220. Moreover, as they attempted to regulate tender offers made for firms 
incorporated in other states, they were considered as unfair to bidding companies221. 
After their judicial review, many of the provisions of these statutes had been 
invalidated by federal courts, culminating in the decision on Edgar v. MITE Corp222. 
 
The second generation of anti-takeover statutes presents a narrower scope of 
protection, focusing on issues of corporate governance of in-state corporations. The 
primary form of these statutes was the “Fair Price Statute”, which required takeovers 
to be approved by a supermajority of shareholders, unless they all received the best 
price paid by the offeror223. The next form was the “Control Share Acquisition Statute”, 
which denied voting rights to a bidder that acquired more than a specified percentage 
of a target's shares, unless these rights were approved by the majority of the target's 
shareholders that were unaffiliated with the bidder224. These statutes had been 
approved by the federal Courts, as it is evidenced by the famous case CTS Corps v. 
Dynamics Corps of America225. Moreover, the last example of second generation 
statutes is the “Stakeholder Statutes” or “Constituency Statutes”, which permit 
management to consider the interests of related groups (such as employees, 
                                                 
219 Wang, p. 96 
220 Magnuson, p. 217 
221 Wang, p.96 
222 Edgar v MITE Corp 457 US 624 (1982), in which the US Supreme Court ruled that the that the Illinois Business Takeover Act was 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  
223 Magnuson, p. 218; see for example CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§33-840 to 33-842 
224 The so called ‘disinterested shareholders’ 
225 CTS Corps v. Dynamics Corps of America, 481 US 69 (1987), in which the Supreme Court declared the Indiana’s anti-takeover 
statute constitutional, as it denied voting rights to an acquirer of 20% of the outstanding shares, unless such voting rights were 
authorized by the target’s independent shareholders in a share holders’ meeting 
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customers, suppliers and communities served by the company) in addition to the 
interests of the shareholders226. 
 
Finally, the third generation of state anti-takeover statutes, as adopted in the late 
1980s, seek to expand their scope of protection of in-state corporations, by prohibiting 
certain post-bid transactions. Concretely, these statutes, generally known as “Business 
Combination or Moratorium Statutes”227 prohibit, often for a limited period and 
subject to certain “fair price” exceptions, a bidder that acquires more than a specified 
percentage of a target's stock from engaging in a post-acquisition business 
combination transactions, such as a merger228, unless such transactions are approved 
by the target’s board or by the super majority of the “disinterested shareholders”229.  
Even though they differ in severity between states 230, third generation statutes have 
so far withheld the various constitutional challenges before federal courts, as it is 
evidenced in the decisions upon BNS INC. v. Koppers Co.Inc.231, Amanda Acquisition 
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp. 232 and West Point-Pepperell Inc v. Farley Inc.233 
 
To summarize, anti-takeover statutes broadened effectively the scope of protection of 
target companies against hostile takeovers, by enabling directors to consider a wider 
range of factors in decision-making and by strengthening the role of shareholders 
during the takeover process234.  
 
Anti-takeover statutes, state law on fiduciary duties and federal legislation regulate 
takeover law in the US. However, this system stands in stark contrast with EU takeover 
law, as formed after the adoption of the E.U Directive on Takeover Bids.  
                                                 
226 As stated in Magnuson, p. 218; examples of these statutes can be found in CAL. CORP. CODE §309 and in IND. CODE ANN. §23-
1-35-1 
227 Examples of these statutes can be found in N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §912 and in DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 203 
228 This type of merger is called a “two-step merger”. In the first step, the purchasing company acquires control of the target 
company usually by means of a tender offer, whereas in the second step, the purchaser uses its control to proceed to a merger 
with the target and freeze out minority shareholders for either cash or securities, as defined in Toms Bate C.(1978), 
“Compensating Shareholders Frozen out in Two- Step Mergers”, Columbia Law Review Volume 78, Issue 3, p. 548   
229 Wang, p. 99  
230 Easterbrook Frank H., Fischel Daniel R. (1991), “The Economic Structure of Corporate Law”, Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 
219 
231BNS INC. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) 
232Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 US 955 (1989) 
233 West Point-Pepperell Inc v. Farley Inc, 711 F. Supp.1096 (N.D. Ga. 1989)  
234 Magnuson, p. 218 
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THE EU FRAMEWORK 
Unlike the United States, where takeover regulation varies significantly among states, 
the European Union has established, a comprehensive legal framework regulating the 
basic elements of tender offers (or takeover bids under EU law) conducted in EU level. 
Adopted in 2004, after years of controversy and unsuccessful attempts, the Directive 
on takeover bids235 constitutes a legal instrument which seeks to harmonize the 
different takeover systems among EU member states. 
 
 In some basic aspects, the Takeover Directive emulates the Williams Act. Typical 
examples of convergence can be found in its provisions requiring the following236 : 
a)that bidders announce their bids without delay, inform the supervisory authorities 
237and make public an offer document that states the basic information regarding the 
bid, such as the terms and conditions, the identity of the offeror and its business plans 
for the target, the consideration and compensation offered e.t.c238, b)that all 
shareholders must be treated equally in takeover bids239 and be offered the highest 
offer price240, c) that bids remain open for a certain time , enabling shareholders to 
reach a decision after being sufficiently informed241 and d) that the bid’s public 
disclosure ensures the transparency and integrity of markets242. 
 
However, despite the above similarities, the Takeover Directive contains five 
innovative provisions which are absent from American Regulation, namely the 
mandatory bid rule, the squeeze-out and sell-out rights, the board neutrality and the 
breakthrough rule, as they will be in short discussed below.  
THE MANDATORY BID RULE 
In accordance with the pre-existing law in most member states, Article 5 of the 
Directive sets forth the so-called mandatory bid rule, under which the acquirer of a 
                                                 
235 Council Directive 2004/25, 2004, O.J. (L 142) 12(EC) (hereinafter “Takeover Directive”) 
236 Ferrarini Guido, Miller Geoffrey P.(2009), “A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe”, Cornell 
International Law Journal, Volume 42, Issue 3,p. 312 
237 Council Directive 2004/25, 2004, O.J. (L 142) 12(EC), Preamble cl.12 and article 6§1  
238 Id. article 6 §2 and §3(a)-(n)  
239 Id. article 3§1(a) 
240 Id. article 5§4 
241 Id. article 3§1(b) and article 7 
242 Id. article 8 
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threshold percentage of a target company’s voting rights is obliged to make a bid for 
all the outstanding shares of the target at an equitable price. The threshold percentage 
is specified by each Member State, whereas the equitable price is defined as “the 
highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror”243 over a period also 
determined by each Member State.  
 
The mandatory bid rule seeks to resolve the principal-principal agency conflict244 first 
by hindering controlling shareholders from selling the private benefits of control245 to 
another party at the expense of the minority shareholders  246; furthermore, it protects 
the minority shareholders by offering an escape hatch247 after the completion of the 
takeover. This provision exceeds the “best price rule” of SEC Regulation248, as it 
requires an “any and all” bid after the bidder reaches a certain threshold of the 
target’s shares, a requirement which is not found under US law. 
 
Despite its protective scope, the mandatory bid rule has been heavily criticized, mainly 
due to the wide leeway given to the Member states to derogate from its minimum 
safeguards, or even waive its enforcement, a fact with proves inconsistency with the 
minimum harmonization technique of article 3§2249. Concretely, article 5§4 in 
conjunction with article 4§5 state that Member States may allow their supervisory 
authorities to decide, on a case-by-case basis, either to adjust the equitable price or 
waive the application of mandatory bid rule, regardless of whether the latter is 
specified by national rules or not250. Furthermore, some critics argue that the 
mandatory bid rule increases the price of takeovers251 , whereas, in general, it fails to 
became fully comprehensive252. 
                                                 
243 Id. Article 5§4 
244 Namely, the conflict between majority and minority shareholders 
245 Namely, “benefits to the controlling shareholder not provided to the minority shareholders”, as stated in Gilson, Ronald J. 
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THE SQUEEZE-OUT AND SELL-OUT RIGHTS 
The protection of minority shareholders is completed through articles 15 and 16, 
which provide the squeeze-out and sell-out rights. Under article 15§2, Member States 
shall ensure that the successful bidder holding at least 90% of the target’s securities is 
entitled to require the holder of the remaining securities to sell him those securities at 
a fair price (squeeze-out right). The Member States shall increase this threshold up to 
95%. Conversely, the minority shareholders are entitled, under article 16 to require 
from the acquirer of 90%-95% of the target’s stock to purchase their securities at a fair 
price (sell-out right). As above stated, both provisions aim to safeguard the minority 
shareholders. The squeeze-out right offers a second chance to sell their shares after 
the completion of the first bid, whereas the sell-out right facilitates their exit from the 
company, protecting them from being oppressed by the acquirer to sell their shares at 
a low price.  
 
However, both provisions may be proven inefficient under certain circumstances. 
Concretely, article 15 does not prohibit statutory mergers, which can serve as a 
technique of de facto squeeze-out at higher costs, but at lower valuations than the 
takeover bid253. Statutory mergers require a lower threshold and do not contain strict 
fair pricing provisions, therefore, their implementation dilutes the efficiency of the 
squeeze-out right. Furthermore, the protection offered by the sell-out right may be 
also proven weak, as in most cases, its exercise depends on the prior launch of a 
mandatory bid254 . However, as the implementation of the mandatory bid rule remains 
at the discretion of the Member States and their national supervisory authorities, the 
sell-out rule is inapplicable in a possible waiver of a mandatory bid rule. Moreover, the 
real value of the sell-out right is also questioned due to the absence of any obligation 
on the offeror to notify the minority shareholders when the right has arisen255.  
THE BOARD NEUTRALITY RULE 
The Takeover Directive addresses also the issue of permissibility of the defensive 
measures in the event of a hostile takeover. Contrary to the US legal framework, in 
                                                 
253 Ibid, p.530 , which refers to the example of the Deutsche Telecom and T-Online case 
254 The case is different if the sell-out right is triggered after a voluntary bid for all the outstanding shares 
255 Edwards Vanessa (2004), “The Directive on Takeover Bids- Not Worth the Paper It’s Written On?”, European Company and 
Financial Law Review, Volume 1, Issue 4, p. 438   
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which the implementation of the defensive measures is permitted if these are not 
“draconian” and the board acts in “good faith” and after “reasonable investigation”, 
the Takeover Directive provides the strict rule of the board’s neutrality256. 
 
Under article 9 of the Directive, once the board of the target company is informed of a 
pending bid257, it is prevented from taking “any action, other than seeking alternative 
bids, which may result in the frustration of the bid”. Defensive measures are by their 
nature aimed at frustrating the bid, therefore, almost all of them constitute a violation 
of the neutrality rule258. However, as the article is modeled on the UK City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers259, it states, that the board may implement defensive 
measures in case such implementation is authorized by the general shareholders’ 
meeting. 
 
It should be underlined, that the Directive specifically refers to two defensive 
measures by approving the one and rejecting the other. First, it states that the board is 
free to seek alternative bids, even without the shareholders’ approval, consequently, it 
allows the white knight defense. On the other hand, it explicitly prohibits the board 
from “issuing any shares which may result in lasting impediment to the offeror’s 
acquiring control of the offeree company”,260  namely it forbids the poison pill defense. 
 
The board neutrality rule remains, in general, in sharp contrast with the US law, which 
offers in most of states a high degree of protection against a hostile takeover. The 
Takeover Directive is not so protective261. It addresses the principal-agency problem by 
requiring the target’s board to act in the best interest of the company and refrain from 
acts which would deprive from the shareholders the right to decide upon the merits of 
a pending bid. In a nutshell, the rule aims to protect shareholders, facilitate corporate 
restructuring, even in the case of hostile takeovers, and encourage investors, however 
                                                 
256  also known as the passivity rule. The rule is also found in US literature, namely  in Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel 
R.(1981), “The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer”, 94 Harvard Law Review, p. 1161 et sec, in 
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it is questioned whether such aims are fulfilled, as under article 12, the 
implementation of the board neutrality rule is left at the discretion of the Member 
States and individual companies. 
THE BREAKTHROUGH RULE 
Another major difference between US law and the Takeover Directive is found in 
article 11 of the latter, which establishes the breakthrough rule. This provision 
facilitates hostile takeovers, as it invalidates a series of corporate strategies or 
arrangements which might be used to hinder or defeat unwanted bids. The 
breakthrough rule establishes the “one-share-one vote” principal and has been 
characterized as “one of the most controversial and complicated”262 provisions of the 
Directive. 
 
Concretely, article 11§2 states that when the bid is made public, any restrictions on the 
transfer of securities shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed for 
the acceptance of the bid 263. Furthermore in §3 the article continues by prohibiting 
the application of restrictions on voting rights during the shareholders’ general 
meeting which decides upon the implementation of any defensive measures. 
Moreover, under §4, if, after the completion of the offer, the offeror holds at least 75% 
of the target’s voting rights, the application of any restrictions on the transfer of 
securities or on voting rights as well as any extraordinary rights of shareholders 
regarding the appointment or removal directors, namely any pre-bid defenses, remain 
inapplicable. Furthermore, under this provision multiple-vote securities shall carry only 
one vote at the first general meeting called by the offeror after the closure of the bid. 
 
The breakthrough rule neutralizes some of the anti-takeover mechanisms used against 
a hostile takeover.264 The provision has a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, it seeks 
to limit the ability of the board to entrench its position and fend off efficient bids, 
whereas, on the other hand, it purports to create a leveled-playing field across 
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Europe265. However, it has been characterized as “controversial”, as it preempts prior 
contractual and legal arrangements266, even though their effect is mitigated under §5, 
which establishes the requirement of “equitable compensation”, paid to shareholders 
whose rights have been broken through267. Finally, among the various deficiencies of 
the article being highlighted in theory268, the most important is again found in article 
12 of the Directive , as the ability of the Member States to opt-out of the breakthrough 
rule, renders the latter a simple recommendation269.   
 
Despite its deficiencies, the Takeover Directive constitutes a comprehensive 
mechanism aiming to achieve a minimum harmonization of takeover regulation among 
EU Member States. Its core differences with the US legal framework raise the question 
regarding which of the two systems facilitates hostile takeovers, an issue briefly 
outlined below. 
THE IDEAL SYSTEM FOR HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
Since the adoption of the Takeover Directive, many commentators attempted to 
compare the effectiveness of the US and EU legal systems on takeovers by focusing on 
the advantages and disadvantages of their key provisions in light of the main goals of 
an ideal takeover regulation: “encouraging value and maximizing takeovers while 
protecting the interests of shareholders”270. This study focuses on indicating which 
system favors specifically hostile takeovers. 
 
The overview of the US and EU legal framework on takeovers leads undoubtedly to the 
conclusion that the launch of a tender offer is easier, from an economic perspective, 
under the US legal system, as the mandatory bid rule of the Takeover Directive, obliges 
the bidder, upon reaching a certain threshold of the target’s voting rights, to make an 
offer for all the outstanding shares of the target company. Furthermore, the sell-out 
right empowers the minority shareholders to demand from the offeror to purchase 
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their shares at a fair price. These provisions, established to protect minority 
shareholders, make takeovers, included the hostile ones, more expensive under EU 
law and possibly, less frequent271. On the contrary, under US law, corporate raiders are 
free to launch a tender offer for as many shares as they desire272, however, in practice, 
they nearly always make full takeover bids for all the voting securities. Consequently, 
in effect, the two systems do not differ in this aspect. 
 
However, once the bid is launched, the US takeover system offers wide discretion to 
the target’s board to apply any defensive measures, without requiring prior 
shareholders’ authorization, provided that they are not “draconian” in comparison to 
the threat posed and the board acted in good faith and after reasonable investigation. 
On the contrary, the Takeover Directive establishes the strict neutrality rule, which 
forbids the adoption of most post-bid defenses, unless the shareholders’ board 
authorizes this adoption. Regarding the pre-bid defenses, these are overridden by the 
breakthrough rule. Furthermore, the squeeze-out right facilitates and encourages the 
bidders who make an offer for all the outstanding shares, as they know in advance 
that, upon reaching the threshold of 90%-95%, they will be able to exercise it to gain 
100% of the target’s equity and apply a more efficient management273.   
 
Before reaching a conclusion, it must be remembered, that the board neutrality and 
the breakthrough rule are optional provisions in the EU Takeover Directive and subject 
to the discretion of the Member States and the various corporations274. Under the 
Commission’s report of the operation of the Takeover Directive275 , 19 Member States 
have transposed the board neutrality rule276, while only the Baltic States277 adopted 
the breakthrough rule, namely only 1% of the listed companies in the EU is 
mandatorily subject to it278 . Furthermore, “in accordance with article 12 (3) of the 
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Directive, about half of the Member States279 allow companies who are subject to the 
board neutrality rule and/or breakthrough rule (by law or based on the articles of 
association of the company) not to apply the rule when they are confronted with a 
takeover bid by an offeror who is not subject to the same rule (reciprocity)”280. 
 
Consequently, from a theoretical point of view, due to the board neutrality rule, the 
breakthrough rule and the sell-out right, the EU Takeover Directive seems to further 
facilitate hostile takeovers in comparison to the US legislation. However, the optional 
and, therefore, uneven transposition of the first two rules in Member States leads to 
the conclusion that whether hostile takeovers are favored or fended off depends on 
the national law applied in each case.  
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HOSTILE TAKEOVERS IN GREECE 
Even though the Takeover Directive sets a common ground, each Member State 
proceeded to its transposition considering its national needs and idiosyncrasies. 
Therefore, before reaching the final conclusions, it is useful to present an overview of 
the Greek Law on takeovers and its position towards the hostile activity. 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
The economic and synergistic advantages of Mergers and Acquisitions became 
apparent in the Greek economy at the early 1990s, almost ten years after the 
accession of Greece to the European Community (EEC) in 1981. The establishment of 
the internal market as a mean to achieve economic integration among the members of 
the EEC, led the various small and, mainly, family-run Greek companies to enter into 
synergies in order to strengthen their economic position281. The first merger wave 
emerged at the late 1990s, due to the unprecedented growth of the Greek capital 
market at this period, which enabled Greek corporations to obtain huge investment 
funds and use them to conduct mergers and acquisitions at a national and 
international level. 
 
 During this period emerged also in Greece the phenomenon of hostile takeovers. The 
first of them was conducted in 1998, when “METKA S.A”, a company which is active in 
the energy, infrastructure and defense sectors282was taken over by “Mytilinaios 
Holdings Group”283. In 1999, Greek economy witnessed also various examples of 
hostile activity, however, two were the most interesting cases:  the first occurred in 
the milling industry, when “St. George Mills S.A” was acquired by its biggest 
competitor, the “Loulis Mills S.A” corporation284; the second, and most important one, 
hit the banking sector, when the “EFG EUROBANK S.A” acquired the “ERGASIAS BANK 
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S.A”285. Furthermore, another example of hostile activity can be found in the Greek 
food industry, when in 2001 Goody’s S.A was taken over by “DELTA HOLDINGS S.A”. All 
these cases lead to the conclusion that, the phenomenon of hostile takeovers is not 
completely unknown to the Greek economy, although it was introduced relatively 
recently and occurs at a low level.  
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Takeovers in Greece are primarily regulated by Law 3461/2006286 on tender offers 
(Takeover Law), which transposed the European Takeover Directive into the Greek law. 
Since its enactment, this Law has been amended through Law 3756/2009287, Law 
3943/2011288, Law 4013/2011289, Law 4281/2014290  and Law 4335/2015291. Before the 
adoption of the Takeover Law, the legal framework on tender offers was determined 
by the 2/258/05.12.2002 Decision of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
(HCMC)292, which replaced the former Decision 1/195/19.07.2000293 .  
 
Greek Takeover Law regulates takeover bids294 for the acquisition of securities of 
public listed companies with a registered seat in Greece295,296. Bids made either for 
targets whose object is the collective investment of capital provided by the public297 or 
for securities issued by the Bank of Greece298 are, however, excluded from its 
regulatory scope. Furthermore, article 4 of the Law renders the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission competent for supervising the compliance with the Law’s provisions and 
the bid procedure in general, whereas article 5 sets the basic principles of the 
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procedure, among which is the equal treatment of all shareholders299 and the 
obligation of the board of directors to act in the best interest of the target300. 
 
The provisions governing the voluntary and mandatory bids are specified in articles 6 
and 7 respectively. Under article 6§1, the person proceeding to a voluntary bid is 
obliged to acquire all the securities offered, unless it has set a maximum number of 
securities that it is bound to accept. It is also possible for the bidder to define a 
minimum number of securities that must be offered for the bid to have effect. 
Moreover, in case the bid is made for shares which do not carry voting rights, the 
above provision applies mutatis mutandis301. On the other hand, article 7 states that if 
the acquisition of a target company’s voting rights exceeds the threshold of the 1/3 of 
the total, the acquirer is obliged, within 20 days from the acquisition, to launch a 
mandatory bid for all the outstanding shares of the target company, paying fair and 
reasonable consideration, as set out in article 9.The same obligation applies also in 
case a person ,holding more than 1/3 but less than 1/2 of the target’s voting shares, 
acquires within  six months another 3% of the target’s total voting shares, unless it has 
already launched a mandatory bid302. However, even if these requirements are met, 
there is still a series of exemptions from the mandatory bid rule, as set out in article 8 
of the Law. 
 
Moreover, Greek Takeover Law has adopted the board neutrality rule along with the 
reciprocity exemption, as article 14 defines. On the contrary, as indicated in article 17, 
Greece has opted-out from the breakthrough rule, leaving its adoption upon the 
discretion of the target’s shareholders, who decide on its implementation in their 
general meeting with increased majority. The provisions of this article have similar 
wording to the ones of article 11 of the Directive and contain also the reciprocity 
exemption303.  
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Squeeze-out and sell-out rights are provided in articles 27 and 28. Concretely, article 
27 states that if, after launching a bid for the total of the outstanding shares, the 
acquirer holds 90% of the target’s voting capital, he can require, within three months 
after the end of the bid acceptance period, the transfer of the remaining securities to 
him, provided that he pays consideration at least equal to the one provided in article 9. 
Conversely, article 28 provides the right of the remaining shareholders to sell their 
shares to the acquirer who has made a bid for all the outstanding shares and acquired 
at least 90% of the target’s voting capital. The sale must be made within three months 
after the publication of the bid’s results and at a price equal to the consideration 
offered in the bid, whereas the acquirer is obliged to make public the shareholders’ 
sell-out rights together with the disclosure of the bid’s results304. 
Apart from the above analyzed core articles, the Greek Takeover Law provides also a 
variety of provisions which complete its regulatory framework, such as those which 
regulate the disclosure of the takeover bid and the bidder’s information duty towards 
the HCMC305, the disclosure of the Fact Sheet306, the duties of the bidder’s advisor307, 
the civil liability of the bidder and its advisor308, disclosure of the opinion of the 
target’s board309,   the acceptance310 , withdrawal311 or review312 of the bid, the 
disclosure of the results of the bid313 etc. 
Finally, it becomes apparent that the Greek Takeover Law constitutes an effective legal 
instrument which is neutral towards hostile takeovers. Even though it adopts the 
board neutrality rule, it opts-out from the breakthrough rule, leaving its 
implementation on the companies’ discretion. The overview of its provisions, leads us 
to the conclusion that the Greek Takeover Law seeks to compromise the interests of 
the various parts involved and ensure a smooth takeover process. 
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Conclusion 
In recent years, Mergers and Acquisitions constitute a field of rapid economic growth. 
The 2015 was a record year for M&A activity, as the Global M&A value was over $5 
trillion, surpassing the previous record of $4.6 trillion set in 2007314. Furthermore 
during 2016 a variety of multi-billion dollar deals were witnessed, such as the 
acquisitions of LinkedIn Corp. by Microsoft Corp, of Time Warner by AT&T, of the 
Dutch NXP Semi-conductors by its rival Qualcomm Inc and of St. Jude Medical Inc by 
Abbott Laboratories315. Hostile activity was also present during this year, as indicated 
by the hostile takeover of Baxalta Inc from the Ireland-headquartered Shire PLC, as 
well as from the hostile, though unsuccessful, bids of Gannet Company Inc for Tribune 
Publishing, of Sanofy for Medivation and of Bayer for Monsato316.  
 
The vast and constant expansion of the takeover activity, even in small economies, 
such as the Greek economy, has rendered the study of its rationale necessary, leading 
to the conclusion that the strong strategic, financial and synergistic advantages of a 
takeover encourage the bidder to pursue the completion of the deal, even without the 
consent of the board of directors of the target company. The development of hostile 
activity led on the one hand to the evolution of the hostile technics available to 
possible bidders, with hostile tender offers being the prominent. On the other hand, it 
provoked the creation of complex takeover defenses, able to neutralize a hostile bid, 
the most effective of which is the “poison pill”. 
 
The legitimacy of takeover defenses and the general legal framework on (hostile) 
takeovers differs among nations, a fact which became apparent in the study of the two 
model systems of US and EU on tender offers. The EU Takeover Directive, despite 
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resulting from lobbying and political compromise, it manages to achieve a minimum 
harmonization among Member States, as well as facilitate hostile takeovers at a 
greater extent than the US law, even though the latter is based on a long-term judicial 
practice. 
 
This minimum legal harmonization is, however, not enough, as it exists only among EU 
Member States. The rapid evolution of hostile takeovers increases their complexity, 
therefore underlines the need of convergence at international level. This aim could be 
achieved through the establishment of an international legal model on hostile 
takeovers which would ensure the equilibrium between the interests of all parties 
involved. Nevertheless, a proposal for such a model has not yet been placed on the 
table. Consequently, the question of whether the two systems will continue to grow 
apart is still open, as their further development remains to be seen. 
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